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LEMONADE OUT OF LEMONS: CAN
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS LEAD TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM?
LOCKE E. BOWMAN*
JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (N.Y.U. Press 2007). 345 PP.

The Commonwealth of Virginia, like many other jurisdictions across
the country, witnessed, during the 1990s and the current decade, a series of
exonerations of persons who had been convicted and sent to prison (some to
Death Row) for crimes they did not commit. Jon Gould's heartfelt and
thoughtfully reasoned volume chronicles the efforts of a small group of
volunteers, Gould among them, to change some of Virginia's criminal
justice practices in the wake of these miscarriages ofjustice.
The conviction and subsequent exoneration of the innocent has
assuredly been the most dramatic-perhaps the most important-recurring
criminal justice story of the last two decades. Through repetition, the
pattern is now familiar: before or shortly following 1989 (the year of the
nation's first DNA exoneration); a suspect-often brown or black, almost
invariably indigent, is convicted of a rape or murder; the state's evidence is
facially compelling: a confession to the police, the testimony of a jail house
snitch, an eyewitness's confident identification, possibly forensic evidence
that appears to link the defendant to the crime scene; but years later, after
Clinical Associate Professor of Law and Legal Director of the Roderick
MacArthur
Justice Center, Northwestern University School of Law. Professor Bowman has represented
a number of wrongfully convicted persons, both in the criminal courts and in civil litigation
seeking compensation for unjust imprisonment. The author gratefully acknowledges Rob
Warden, Executive Director of the Northwestern School of Law's Center on Wrongful
Convictions, for his ideas and conversation, and Benjamin Thelen, Esq., for his capable
research assistance.
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the advent of DNA forensic technology, biological evidence establishes that
someone other than the defendant committed the crime. As of this writing,
this scenario has unfolded 218 times in the United States.'
In tandem with DNA exonerations, and probably to some extent
because of them, this same time period has also witnessed the exoneration
of hundreds of additional prisoners as a result of witness recantations, the
exposure of investigatory misconduct, and the like.2 There is every reason
to presume that the documented wrongful convictions are but a fraction of
the true number of cases in3 which an innocent person was sent to prison for
a crime he did not commit.
The consequences of wrongful conviction are profound.
An
unspeakable tragedy is visited upon those who are falsely convicted, some
of whom endure decades of harsh, unjust imprisonment before their
exonerations. 4 With news of exonerations, victims and their family
members are forced to relive the crime and its aftermath, years after they
had every reason to believe the guilty party had been safely locked away.
In some cases, with police, prosecutors, and the courts focused on the
wrong person, the guilty perpetrator has remained free and has committed
subsequent serious crimes that might have been prevented.5
The Innocence Project, Know the Cases, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last
visited Sept. 23, 2008).
2 Estimates of non-DNA exonerations vary. The Northwestern University School of
Law's Center on Wrongful Convictions estimates the number of non-DNA exonerations
since 1989 as in excess of four hundred. Samuel R. Gross and co-authors put the number of
non-DNA exonerations between 1989 and 2003 at around two hundred. See Samuel R.
Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005).

3 Gross et al., supranote 2, at 527.
4 In one case in Illinois, Paul Terry and Michael Evans each served twenty-seven years
for the rape and murder of Lisa Cabassa before DNA evidence exonerated them. Center on
Wrongful
Convictions,
Michael
Evans,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/ilEvansTerrySummary.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
In another case in Louisiana, Rickey Johnson served twenty-five years for a sexual assault
that he did not commit before DNA evidence also exonerated him in January 2008. Koran
Addo, DNA Test Sought in BR Case, THE ADvoc. (Baton Rouge), Jan. 16, 2008, at B1.
5 Gould describes a bizarre scenario of this type. Julius Ruffin was convicted of a 1984
rape, and was exonerated when DNA tests in 2002 excluded him and pointed to a convicted
rapist, Aaron Doxie III, as the perpetrator. Previously, Arthur Lee Whitfield was wrongfully
prosecuted and convicted for two rapes that had occurred in 1981. When Whitfield was
exonerated by DNA evidence in 2004, the testing established that the crimes for which he
served time had also been committed by Doxie. If Doxie had been charged in Ruffin's
place, the crimes for which Whitfield was wrongfully convicted would never have occurred.
See JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND

RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 108-09 (2008).
Another example, to which Gould alludes, is the case of David Vasquez. See GOULD,
supra, at 112-19. The actual perpetrator of the rape and murder for which Vasquez was
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The costs are enormous and impossible to quantify. Immeasurable
suffering is caused to the wrongfully convicted as a result of shattered
personal and community ties, the loss of freedom (sometimes for decades),
harsh conditions of imprisonment, and ruined psyches.6 There is also a
broader effect, as confidence in the criminal justice system is shaken.
Police-community relations may be further undermined in communities
where such relationships have historically been strained. In extreme cases,
the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice process may be called into
question.
There is also high drama and human interest in the exoneration of an
innocent person, who may have spent many years in prison. Even after
scores of repetitions, the image of an innocent person walking through the
prison gates still has great salience for the media and the public. This is
now the stuff of movies, novels, and best selling non-fiction accounts.7
Gould's book discusses how reformers might capitalize on the socalled "innocence issue" to advance criminal justice reforms designed to
safeguard against conviction of the innocent. In a few more years there will
be very few cases in which old evidence can be re-examined using new
DNA analysis. The era of wholesale DNA exonerations is drawing to a
close. If the public attention focused on wrongful convictions can catalyze
criminal justice reform, then the window of opportunity afforded by this
phenomenon is narrowing. For that reason alone, Gould's book is timely
and important.
Reforming law enforcement practices is not easy. The State of Illinois
is unquestionably the gold standard for positive accomplishment in this

convicted, Timothy W. Spencer, committed four additional rape-murders three years
following the crimes for which Vasquez was wrongfully sent to prison. See Dana Priest,
Wrongly JailedMan Endures Ordeal by Fear, WASH. POST, July 17, 1989, at Al.
6 In Illinois, four exonerated prisoners known as the Ford Heights Four, who had
collectively spent over six decades in prison for a double murder and rape they did not
commit, settled their civil rights claims for a total of $36 million. Ken Armstrong & Robert
Becker, Record Ford Heights 4 Payout May Not Be End: Criminal Investigation Under
Consideration,CHI TRIB., Mar. 6, 1999, at 1. A jury awarded $15 million to another Illinois
man, James Newsome, who spent fifteen years in prison for a murder he did not commit.
Matt O'Connor, Lineup Suit Nets $15 Million: U.S. Jury Awards Record Amount for 15
Years in Prison,CHI TRIB., Oct. 30, 2001, at 1. In Chicago, the plaintiff's civil rights bar
typically demands $1 million per year of wrongful incarceration in suits against police
investigators. Elsewhere, compensation has been less. Gould reports that Earl Washington,
who spent sixteen years in prison for a crime he did not commit, later won a civil rights
judgment of $1.9 million, which Gould reports, was the largest civil rights judgment in
Virginia history. GOULD, supra note 5, at 83.
7 See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND INJUSTICE IN A SMALL

TowN (2006); SCOTT TuRow, REVERSIBLE ERRORS (2002); IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER
(Hell's Kitchen Films 1993).
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regard, but the successes there came about as a result of an unlikely
combination of factors. 8 In Illinois, reform of the criminal justice system
was linked to the death penalty abolition movement. Capital punishment
opponents used exonerations of the innocent from the state's Death Row to
call for an end to the Illinois death penalty. They claimed that the capital
punishment system was "broken," pointing to the fact that between 1977
and 2000 Illinois exonerated more men from its Death Row (thirteen) than
it executed (twelve). 9 Public concern was heightened with the exoneration
of Anthony Porter, who, in 1999, came within forty-eight hours of
execution, was given a stay of execution because of concern about his
competency to stand trial, and, with the stay in place, was exonerated
through the efforts of a team of Northwestern journalism students who were
reinvestigating his case as a class project.' 0 Then, three additional death
row exonerations-Steven Smith, Ronald Jones, and Steve Manningfollowed in quick succession during the course of 1999.
In response, former Illinois Governor George Ryan in January 2000
declared a moratorium on executions and appointed a Commission on
Capital Punishment to study the causes of wrongful convictions and
recommend reforms." The Governor's moratorium and call for study of
criminal justice reforms was a middle ground, falling short of total abolition
of the death penalty, which had been (and remained) the principal reform
goal of many of those whose public advocacy had brought the wrongful
conviction issue to the top of the political agenda.
Over two years later, after exhaustive research, the Ryan Commission
issued a comprehensive report proposing eighty-five specific reforms.
Some of the Ryan Commission's key proposals were enacted by the Illinois
legislature. As Gould recounts, 12 Illinois now requires, for example, the
13
video recording of custodial interrogations in all homicide investigations,
reliability hearings prior to the admission of "snitch" testimony against a
defendant,14 and competency certification for all counsel who defend capital
cases.' 5 Most famously, the report also led Governor Ryan in January 2003
8 For a detailed, well-told account of how exonerations of the innocent paved the way to
criminal justice reform in Illinois, see Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How It
Happened, What It Promises,95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381 (2005).
9 Editorial, Fixing the Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 2000, at 22.
10Anthony Porter, in the embrace of Northwestern journalism Professor David Protess
with his students looking on, is pictured on the dust jacket of Gould's book.
I1 Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan: 'Until I Can Be Sure'; Illinois Is First State to
Suspend Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2000, at 1.
12 GOULD, supra note 5, at 208-09.
13 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1 (2008).
14 Id. § 5/115-21.
15 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 714.
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to commute the death sentences of every prisoner on the Illinois Death
Row. 16

Following several of its own miscarriages of justice, North Carolina,
acting more modestly than Illinois, established the North Carolina Actual
Innocence Commission at the urging of the state's chief justice.' 7 The
Commission examines the correlates of wrongful convictions and issues
recommendations for the improvement of criminal justices practices. By
the Commission's account, its recommended protocols for line-ups and
other eyewitness identification procedures are "increasingly" being
implemented by law enforcement agencies. 8 In 2006, North Carolina also
created an Innocence Inquiry Commission with limited authority to review
and recommend judicial
reconsideration of cases with "suspected
' 9
miscarriages of justice."'
In the wake of the widely reported DNA exoneration of Steven Avery
in Wisconsin in 2003, that state enacted legislation to require electronic
recording of custodial interrogations, to require implementation of law
enforcement agency procedures for handling eyewitness identifications, and
to require new procedures for retaining biological evidence.2 ° In 2004,
following a several-year campaign by Senator Patrick Leahy and activists at
the Washington, D.C.-based Justice Project, the federal government enacted
the Innocence Protection Act, 2' which permits a federally convicted person
to apply for post-conviction DNA testing under specified circumstances.
These are impressive successes. But, given the enormous personal toll
for those directly affected by wrongful conviction, the practical costs to the
entire criminal justice system of such miscarriages, and the moral
implications for society at large, it is more noteworthy how little reform has
actually occurred and how incomplete the reforms have been, even in
16 Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Clemency for All: Ryan Commutes 164 Death
Sentences to Life in Prison Without Parole, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at 1. Just prior to

emptying Death Row with his mass clemency, Governor Ryan granted pardons based on
actual innocence to four Death Row prisoners whose convictions rested on confessions
produced by torture at the hands of Chicago Police detectives. With the exoneration of
Randy Steidl in 2004, the total of Illinois Death Row exonerations reached eighteen out of
289 persons sentenced to death total-an error rate of over 6%. See Warden, supra note 8, at
381.
17GOULD,supra note 5, at 40-4 1.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 226-27.
20 Id. at 225-26.

WIs. STAT. § 968.073 (2007) (electronic recording of custodial

interrogations); WIs. STAT. § 175.50 (2007) (procedures for handling witness
identifications); WIS. STAT. § 165.77 (2007) (procedures for handling of biological
evidence).
21Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3600
(2006)).
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Illinois, which failed to implement a number of the Ryan Commission's
proposals.2 2 Gould, a veteran of multiple national political campaigns, lays
out the problem in the language of political science: criminal justice
practices are deeply entrenched and the system is highly resistant to change;
wrongful convictions furnish an opportunity for reform, but not one that is
self-executing; change can only come about through the efforts of
"resourceful policy advocates," but those advocates face powerful
opposition from those who are committed to the status quo.23
As Gould acknowledges, Virginia's criminal justice system has
historically been a backwater. It woefully underpays defense counsel
appointed to represent the indigent, with fee caps that are at or near the
lowest in the nation.24 Until recently, Virginia infamously enforced a strict
"21 day rule," which barred a defendant from attacking his conviction on
the basis of new evidence of actual innocence when more than twenty-one
days had expired following the conviction.25 The Commonwealth has a
sordid history of racial misconduct, including in its criminal justice system,
which featured slave codes and a variety of other overtly racist provisions
and practices.26 Virginia remains deeply committed to the use of capital
punishment, having executed 102 people since 1976, more than any other
state except Texas.27
Not surprisingly, Virginia has produced its fair share of wrongful
convictions. In 2001, Earl Washington, Jr. and Marven Anderson, both
black and each convicted in the early 1980s of sexually attacking a white
woman, were formally exonerated as a result of DNA evidence that
excluded them as a possible attacker. In the judgment of Gould and his
collaborators, these widely reported and shocking exonerations furnished in

22 See GOULD, supra note 5, at 208-09.
23 Id. at 230-35.

24 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (2008) provides that attorneys may receive up to $1235 for
representing clients in non-capital felony cases where the client might receive more than
twenty years in jail. Virginia caps fees for all other non-capital felonies at $445. Virginia
recently allowed courts to waive those caps under some circumstances and pay attorneys an
additional $850 for cases where their client might receive more than twenty years in jail, and
$155 in all other non-capital felony cases. However, some critics charge that the $8.2
million appropriated to pay these increased fees "will fund only one out of four waiver
requests." Georgia N. Vagenas, National Developments in 2007, 22 CRIM. JUST. 58, 59
(2008).

25 VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A: 15. Virginia has since adopted two provisions that limit the scope
of this rule, discussed infra, notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
26 A.

LEON

HIGGINBOTHAM,

JR.,

SHADES

OF

FREEDOM:

RACIAL

POLITICS

PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 30-36, 43, 135-37 (1996).

AND

27 Death Penalty Information Center, Number of Executions by State and Region Since

1976, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=186 (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
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their aftermath a window of opportunity to push for reform of some of
Virginia's criminal justice practices.2 8
Lacking "an immediate political constituency" 29 -i.e., legislative or
other official sponsorship--Gould and colleagues took the creative and
audacious step of privately constituting themselves as "The Innocence
Commission for Virginia," with a mission to investigate "the problems that
may lead to wrongful convictions," to report their findings, and to "offer a
series of best practices to improve" the system. 30 The directors of the
Innocence Commission planned that the legitimacy of their report would
derive from their established reputations, 3' from the thoroughness of their
investigation, and from the reasonableness of their recommendations.
The staff of the Innocence Commission 32 conducted a comprehensive
examination of the eleven "official" exonerations of rape and murder
convictions that had occurred in that state since 1980. Believing that the
inclusion of cases in which the judiciary and/or the executive had not
officially acknowledged the innocence of the convicted person would invite
a distracting debate, the Innocence Commission chose to limit its study to
those cases in which state officials had ultimately admitted the defendant's
innocence.3 3
The Commission surveyed law enforcement agencies regarding their
practices for handling eyewitness identifications and conducting custodial
questioning of suspects, and surveyed Virginia prosecutors regarding their
pretrial discovery practices.34 In the end, the Commission identified nine
factors that were linked to erroneous convictions: (1) mistaken eyewitness
identifications, (2) suggestive eyewitness identification procedures, (3)
"tunnel vision" on the part of police and prosecutors, (4) "antiquated"
forensic science, (5) inadequate defense counsel, (6) failure by police and
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory material, (7) police interrogations of
mentally challenged suspects, (8) "inconsistent statements" made by

28 GOULD, supra note 5, at 52-53.
29 Id. at 234.

Id. at 64.
31 In addition to Gould, an established academic at George Mason University, the
30

directors included the president and founder of the Washington, D.C.-based Constitution
Project; the pro bono counsel at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Affiliates; a
litigator from Sidley Austin LLP; and the project director for what is now known as the MidAtlantic Innocence Project. Id. at 46, 57.
32 The Commission was staffed by in-kind pro bono contributions from several
prominent law firms. Id. at 58-59.
33 Id. at 61.
31 Id. at 65.
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wrongfully accused defendants, and (9) the unavailability of adequate postconviction remedies.35
Based on its investigation and analysis, the Commission proposed
seven broad reforms in its
March 2005 report, the first three of which Gould
' 36
identifies as "primary[:]
*
Police procedural reforms to increase the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications, including: (a) use of multiple person line-ups or photo
arrays as opposed to single-suspect identification procedures, (b)
specific instructions to witnesses that the perpetrator may not be
included in the array, (c) sequential, rather than simultaneous,
presentation of line-up participants to the witness, and (d) electronic
recording of the procedure.
*
Reforms to the custodial interrogation process, including a
requirement that custodial interrogations be videotaped from inception
to conclusion and a requirement that detectives be trained to recognize
mental illness and mental retardation in interrogation subjects.
*
The creation of a clear judicial procedure for convicted persons to
present claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence, without time limitation.
0
Improvement of the indigent defense system, including the
creation of a statewide system and allowing appropriate compensation
for appointed counsel.
*
Judicial acceptance of advances in scientific forensic detection,
but subject to rigorous examination
under a rubric similar to that set
37
out in the Daubert decision.
*
"Open file" discovery to the defense of all non-privileged
material relating to the investigation in the possession of police and
prosecutors.
*
Training of police in how to avoid "tunnel vision"-the
unwarranted focus on a single suspect early in the investigation.
The reform proposals flow from the eleven cases that the Innocence
Commission examined; they are an attempt to correct practices that figured
in one or more of the wrongful convictions. They are all eminently
reasonable and should not be controversial. Indeed, they mirror several key
proposals from the Illinois Ryan Commission report and the suggestions of
leading practitioners in the "innocence" field.38 Mistaken eyewitness
35 Id. at 77-78.
36 See id. at 133-98.
37 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
38

See JIM

DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO

MAKE IT RIGHT

app. 1 (New Am. Library 2003).
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identifications have figured in the great majority of the known wrongful
convictions. 39 False confessions have also been present in a number of
these cases, as Steven Drizin and Richard Leo have impressively
documented.4 ° Underpaid and inept defense counsel have perniciously
affected the criminal justice system, particularly in capital cases, 4 1 and have
had an unfortunate role in dozens of wrongful convictions (the well-to-do
are almost never victims of miscarriage of justice). Concealed exculpatory
evidence is a particularly galling feature of a number of false convictions.42
Procedural reform to permit full and fair judicial examination of serious
claims of wrongful conviction is an obvious need. Nor can there be any
doubt as to the value of training to alert police and prosecutors to the real
possibility of erroneous prosecutions.43
As Gould emphasizes, none of the Commission's proposed criminal
justice reforms could be tailored solely to benefit the wrongfully accused.44
Wrongful conviction cases arise in the context of broadly applied practices.
There are not, in other words, strict causes of wrongful convictions that
could be somehow surgically removed from the system. Instead, reforms
must be aimed at practices that have been found to correlatewith wrongful
convictions. When the reforms are applied, they will sweep more broadly
and will affect many cases in which the accused person is guilty.
This is why the innocence phenomenon is so important for the criminal
justice system. It furnishes a sense of urgency and can potentially open the
minds of judges, legislators, and law enforcement actors to the need for
change. Importantly, since the reforms that Gould and others have

39 GOULD, supra note 5, at 133.
40

Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-

DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004).
41 Stephen B. Bright, Director, Southern Ctr. For Human Rights, Will the Death Penalty
Remain Alive in the Twenty-First Century?: International Norms, Discrimination,
Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Executing the Innocent, Twelfth Thomas E. Fairchild Lecture
at the University of Wisconsin Law School (Oct. 27, 2000), in 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1, 16-22.
42 See, e.g., Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming a $15
million jury verdict against police officers who concealed exculpatory evidence from a man
who spent fifteen years in prison for a crime he did not commit); DAVID PROTESS & ROB
WARDEN, A PROMISE OF JUSTICE (1998) (describing how police withheld an exculpatory
police report, causing the so-called Ford Heights Four to spend collectively over six decades
in prison for a crime they did not commit).
43 Notably absent from the Innocence Commission's list of needed reforms is a proposal
for the pre-trial vetting of snitch testimony, an omission that results from the fact that none
of the eleven cases in the Commission's study featured snitch evidence. But such evidence,
often introduced by prosecutors to buoy an otherwise weak case, is a hallmark of many
wrongful convictions. See the discussion of the James O'Dell case, infra, at notes 67-72 and
accompanying text.
44 GOULD, supra note 5, at 126-31.
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proposed are designed to improve the accuracy and integrity of the system,
implementation of those reforms can also be expected to contribute to
securing swifter and more certain convictions in cases where the defendant
is guilty.
Gould argues that the chances for achieving criminal justice reforms
are maximized when advocates pursue a conciliatory strategy, appealing not
only to the defense bar but also to law enforcement and conservative
interests. "Sober" arguments, based on the proposition that criminal justice
reform will improve public safety and confidence in law enforcement, offer
the only hope of persuading law-and-order conservatives. An element of
this across-the-aisle strategy is the avoidance of what Gould at one point
terms "puerile flame throwing. ' 45 Accusations that the system is "broken"
destroy the possibility for dialogue and the establishment of common
ground; they should be avoided.46
The Virginia Innocence Commission was an unprecedented and bold
initiative. Lacking official sanction, an abundance of faith and conviction
was required to instigate this project. Within its defined parameters, the
Commission's study and findings are thorough-the obvious product of
many hours of labor on the part of a number of individuals. It is no surprise
that the release of the Commission's report was widely covered in the
media and was respectfully received by legislators and other policy makers.
But the Commission's report had little effect on Virginia's criminal
justice practices. On the positive side, in July 2005, three months after the
Commission's report, the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services
issued a sample order for use by police departments regarding the conduct
of eyewitness identification procedures. The sample order, which has no
binding effect, calls for the sequential presentation of line-up subjects. But,
disappointingly, it does not call for double-blind administration of line-ups,
a reform that is essential to remove the risk of intentional or inadvertent
steering of eyewitnesses. As Gould notes, the DCJS sample order was to
some degree prompted by the Virginia State Crime Commission's issuance
of a report on line-up procedures at about the same time as the Innocence
Commission report was released.47
Virginia has also limited the scope of the draconian twenty-one-daysfrom-conviction limitation on presentation of newly discovered evidence of
innocence, a rule that had long sullied Virginia's reputation. In 2001, the
year of the Washington and Anderson exonerations, Virginia began
permitting a person convicted of a felony to move for new scientific testing
41Id.
46
47

at 57.

Id.
Id. at 213-14.
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of evidence (if certain conditions are met) at any time following
conviction. 4 ' And in 2004, the year prior to the Commission's report,
Virginia established a "writ of actual innocence," permitting persons
convicted of a felony, unless as the result of a guilty plea, to present newly
discovered evidence of their actual innocence at any time after conviction.
To prevail, the petitioner must establish that, taking into account the new
evidence, "no rational finder of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. 49
As Gould notes, 50 however, decisions that the Virginia Supreme Court
issued in 2007 following the issuance of the Innocence Commission's
report have made the writ of actual innocence all but unavailable as a
practical matter for petitioners who do not have DNA evidence establishing
their innocence. 51
In 2004, in the wake of a scathing study performed by the
Spangenberg Group under the auspices of the American Bar Association,52
Virginia established an Indigent Defense Commission to provide oversight
and certification of attorneys who accept appointments to represent indigent
defendants. Since the Innocence Commission report, however, little else
has transpired to improve the state of indigent defense in the state. Virginia
has increased the amount that court appointed attorneys can receive, but the
increase still leaves those attorneys vastly undercompensated.53 The state
has not enacted any other reforms to improve its crippled indigent defense
system.
The Virginia state crime lab was subjected to an extensive audit,
ordered by former Governor Mark Warner in 2004. Governor Warner
claimed that the audit, which was performed by the American Society of
Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory Accreditation Board, gave the state
ANN.§ 19.2-327.1 (2008).
Id. §§ 19.2-327.2 to -327.6.
50 GOULD, supra note 5, at 214.
51 Carpitcher v. Commonwealth, 273
Commonwealth, 273 Va. 315, 321-24 (2007).
48 VA. CODE.
49

52 ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG

Va.

335,

345-47

(2007);

ET AL., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP,

A

Johnson

v.

COMPREHENSIVE

REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA (2004).
53 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163 (2008) and discussion,

supra, note 24. Even with the
possibility of earning up to $2085 ($1235 plus $850) for work on felony cases that carry the
possibility of more than twenty years in prison, Virginia remains one of the worst states in
terms of compensating court-appointed attorneys. Not all states impose per-case maximums,
but, of those that do, only Mississippi imposes a lower non-waiveable cap on fees paid to its
court-appointed attorneys ($1000 plus $25 per hour for "overhead expenses"). REBECCA A.
DESILETS ET AL., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURTAPPOINTED COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE
OVERVIEW

(2007).
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lab a clean bill of health-a conclusion that, Gould intimates, may be fairly
debated.54
There is no further progress to report. The Virginia judiciary has not
adopted the Daubert framework for evaluating the admissibility of forensic
findings, as the Innocence Commission recommended. The criminal
discovery practices of Virginia prosecutors continue to be shockingly
regressive. The Innocence Commission survey found that most prosecutors
in the state do not disclose police reports to defense counsel. 55 Two-thirds
of Virginia prosecutors do not provide the defense with the names and
addresses of witnesses.5 6 Prosecutors in the state almost never disclose
police officers' field notes or crime lab technicians' bench notes.57 Gould
offers no indication that these practices have changed. Virginia has not
adopted measures to require videotaping of custodial interrogations. And,
finally, the State has taken no steps to mandate training on the dangers for
police investigators of "tunnel vision."
This is certainly not a basis for criticism of the Innocence
Commission, the report that it issued, or the reform strategy that followed
the release of the report. The success of reform movements necessarily
depends upon raw political factors well beyond the control of the
"resourceful policy advocates" who conceive the reforms and advance the
policy reasons in favor of their adoption.
As Rob Warden, a key player in the Illinois reform movement, has
noted, the success of the reform legislation there hinged entirely on the
confluence of two highly unlikely events in the political arena. First,
Republican Governor George Ryan, a lifelong death penalty supporter,
metamorphosed into a death penalty opponent. Then, with Governor Ryan
departing from office in the shadow of a corruption scandal that would
shortly thereafter lead to his federal indictment and conviction,58 the
Republican majority was voted out of the Illinois Senate in the 2002 general
election and a progressive Democrat assumed the powerful post of Senate
majority leader, replacing a long-term opponent of criminal justice reform.59
No comparable realignment of the political stars has yet happened in
Virginia. 60 There is cause for disappointment at Virginia's failure thus far
54 See GOULD, supra note 5, at 219-21.
" Id. at 186.
56

Id.

57 Id.
58

Matt O'Connor & Ray Gibson, Ryan Indicted: U.S. Charges Former Governor with

Patternof Corruption, CHi. TRIB., Dec. 18, 2003, at 1.
59 Warden, supra note 8, at 388.
60 It might be interesting to analyze the extent to which Virginia's changing political
demographics have and will continue to make the Commonwealth more open to the kinds of
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to more fully reform problematic criminal justice practices, and for
righteous indignation at the events that led to some of Virginia's most
notorious miscarriages of justice and at Virginia's striking failures to
acknowledge the deep flaws in its system.
The Earl Washington case, the first of the eleven cases that the
Innocence Commission analyzed, is by Gould's account 6' a study in how
the government can remain committed to a prosecution even in the face of
exonerating evidence, and in how the system can stubbornly refuse for
years to correct an undeniable miscarriage of justice. Washington, an
African-American, was charged in 1983 with the rape and murder of a
white woman the prior year in Culpepper, Virginia. He was convicted and
sentenced to death despite the fact that the seminal fluid found at the crime
scene did not match Washington's blood type.62
Gould writes that Washington's trial counsel "did not appreciate the
significance" of the semen evidence, which the Commonwealth had turned
over in pre-trial discovery.6 3 This is an understatement. There could be no
serious dispute that a single attacker had committed the crime and that,
therefore, the lack of a match had enormous, if not decisive, exonerative
effect. That Washington was nonetheless prosecuted and sentenced to
death without strenuous objection based on this exculpatory evidence is a
testament to his trial counsel's mind-boggling ineptitude. Indeed, even with
no objection from the defense, it should deeply trouble any objective
observer that the Commonwealth, also in possession of the information,
chose to pursue this prosecution at all.64 Years later, in 1993, DNA testing
confirmed that the seminal fluid had a genetic marker that Washington does
not possess. Inexplicably, this led former Virginia Governor L. Douglas
Wilder not to pardon Washington for the wrongful conviction, but, instead,
merely to commute his sentence from death to life in prison. The test
results that led to Wilder's decision were not shared with Washington's
attorneys.65
reforms proposed by the Innocence Commission. Gould mentions that possibility, but it is
not his subject here.
61 See GOULD, supranote 5, at 79-83.
62

Id. at 80.

63 Id.

64 Washington, who suffers from mental retardation, had "confessed" to the crime during
an interrogation in which, as the prosecutors knew, Washington had been fed information
about clothing left at the crime scene and had made statements wildly at odds with the
evidence-including getting the victim's race wrong. See id. at 79-80. In 2006, a federal
jury concluded that investigators had fabricated the confession and awarded Washington
$1.9 million in compensation. Jerry Markon, Wrongfully JailedMan Wins Suit: Va. Officer
FalsifiedConfession, Jury Rules, WASH. POST, May 6, 2006, at B 1.
65 GOULD, supra note 5, at 82.
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In 1999, facing media pressure, Virginia's new Governor, James
Gilmore, disclosed the 1993 DNA results and ordered another round of
tests, which confirmed the findings from 1993-and those in the original
report-and, for the first time, also connected the semen to the true
perpetrator.66 Gilmore thereupon pardoned Washington, some sixteen years
following his arrest, based on the 1999 DNA findings that essentially did
little more than confirm exonerating information that had been in the
Commonwealth'spossession priorto Washington's conviction.
Virginia's most infamous failure to admit the possibility that the
Commonwealth had convicted an innocent man was in the case of Joseph
O'Dell, who was executed in 1997 for a rape and murder that had taken
place in Virginia Beach in 1985. O'Dell's conviction rested on his
checkered past, on the facts that he had been in the same bar as the victim
during the evening before she was attacked and had blood on his shirt and
jacket at the time of his arrest, and on the testimony of a jail house snitch
claiming that O'Dell confessed to the crime.67
Post-conviction DNA testing failed to establish a match between the
blood on O'Dell's clothing and victim's blood, and O'Dell claimed that the
blood had resulted from a fistfight on the night of the murder. The jail
house snitch evidence, given in exchange for prosecutorial lenience, has
twice been recanted since the trial.68 Much of the remaining circumstantial
evidence against O'Dell withers under scrutiny.6 9
Seminal fluid was recovered from the victim, which the prosecution
theorized had been deposited by the perpetrator. In the months leading to
his execution, O'Dell and his counsel petitioned the Virginia courts for
permission to conduct PCR-based DNA testing on this evidence. A DNA
result excluding O'Dell would have further substantiated O'Dell's claim
that he did not attack the victim. At a minimum, it would have undermined
the rape case and required the vacation of O'Dell's death sentence. The
Virginia Supreme Court refused O'Dell's petition for DNA testing.7 °
Following O'Dell's execution, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Richmond petitioned the Virginia courts for access to the evidence, seeking,
in effect, the opportunity to make a factual record as to whether Virginia
had executed an innocent person. Testing might even have led to the
discovery of a true perpetrator who was not O'Dell. The Commonwealth
vehemently opposed the petition, famously arguing that if the test results
66

67

Id. at 82-83.
This account of the O'Dell case is drawn from SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, THE DEATH OF

INNOCENTS: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF WRONGFUL EXECUTIONS 54-166

68
69

Id. at 165-66.
See id. at 61-82.

70

Va. Killer is at Death's Door, DAILY PRESS, July 21, 1997, at A4.
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did suggest O'Dell's innocence, "it would be shouted from the rooftops that
the Commonwealth of Virginia executed an innocent man. 71 The petition
was denied and the evidence has been destroyed. 2
Gould does not discuss the O'Dell case. Since O'Dell never achieved
an official exoneration, his case fell outside of the Innocence Commission's
scope. The case merits study, however, because it, like the Washington
case, glaringly reveals a recurrent theme in wrongful prosecution cases: the
government's stubborn official refusal to acknowledge error, to engage in
critical self-examination, and to discipline those whose negligent or
intentional misconduct caused the miscarriage of justice.7 3 Better to circle
the wagons, as the Commonwealth did in the O'Dell case, or to take half
measures, as Governor Wilder did in the Washington case, than to face the
cold truth that persons in possession of enormous power may have
negligently or intentionally abused it. This is not "tunnel vision"-it is
blind intransigence.
Gould certainly appreciates this dimension of the problem. He argues
persuasively that the criminal justice system should engage in a post hoc
search for the causes of wrongful convictions similar to the investigations
of airline disasters that are undertaken by the National Transportation
Safety Board.74 But, intent on his across-the-aisle political objectives, he
chooses to dwell lightly on the distressing fact that, in criminal justice, such
self-criticism routinely fails to happen. Nor does he fully address the
ethical implications of that failure.
By Gould's account, a number of the other wrongful conviction cases
in the Innocence Commission study were the product of serious official
failings, be they gross negligence or deliberate misconduct. By way of
example:
.
David Vasquez, mentally impaired and vulnerable, was
interrogated by investigators who must have recognized that he was
clueless about how the rape-murder for which he was wrongfully
charged had been committed, until they fed him the details of the
crime and lied to him about his fingerprints having been found at the
crime scene. Vasquez was then prosecuted for the crime despite
serological evidence showing that seminal material recovered from the
71
72

Paul F. Enzinna, Afraid of a Shadow of a Doubt, WASH.
Id.

POST,

May 7, 2000, at B8.

73 The

month after a federal jury awarded Kevin Fox a $15.5 million verdict against Will
County, Illinois sheriffs deputies, including hefty punitive damages, the Will County
Sherriff's spokesperson essentially dismissed the verdict as "Monday morning
quarterbacking." Hal Dardick, Cop in Fox Case Linked to Lawsuits; High Profile Cases
That Detective Worked Fell Apart, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 2008, at 1.
74 GOULD,

supra note 5, at 76.
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Since Vasquez's
victim could not have come from Vasquez.
"confession" did not include an accomplice and Vasquez was
completely incapable of naming one when he was questioned on that
point, any reasonable investigator should have recognized that the
serological evidence was exonerating.75
0
The investigators who wrongfully charged Marvin Anderson with
rape manipulated the complaining witness into identifying Anderson
as her attacker with a suggestive photo array. At his criminal trial,
Anderson, astonishingly, was represented by counsel who had
previously represented the actual perpetrator of the crime.76
*
The wrongful murder prosecution of Jeffrey Cox was tainted by
egregious failures of police and prosecutors to disclose exculpatory
information-i.e., impeachment evidence regarding key witnesses and
a trove of evidence from police files-and by police destruction of
potentially exculpatory evidence only three months after Cox's
conviction.77
There is no doubting the cogency of Gould's argument that these cases
demonstrate the need for specific criminal justice reforms: the Washington,
Vasquez, Anderson, and Cox cases are all clear examples of the problem of
tunnel vision. Washington and Vasquez demonstrate the need for
videotaping interrogations. Anderson shows the need for reform of
eyewitness identification procedures. And Cox reflects the need to reform
prosecutorial discovery practices.
But there is more. The events in Gould's chronicle of the Virginia
wrongful conviction cases cry out for censure. Yet Gould purposefully
avoids opprobrium-a style that may gain points in legislative negotiation,
but leaves the reader puzzled about whether Gould has the ability to
recognize evidence of police and prosecutorial misconduct (and judicial
acquiescence). Gould's book, after all, is not written solely for legislative
staffers. It is a retelling for the general audience of how the Innocence
Commission came to be, how the report was fashioned, and the results of
the Commission's post-report lobbying efforts. Thus, it is an opportunity
for Gould's own moral views to shine through in the telling. Regrettably,
there is a flat and toneless quality to much of Gould's account.
The cause of reform will not be advanced by a single voice. Righteous
indignation at governmental indifference and outright abuse of power,
unleavened with reasoned argument, will surely bum itself out without ever
meaningfully engaging with authority or offering any prospect of reform.
71Id. at 112-19.

Id. at 83-88.
77 Id. at 94-99.
76

2008]

LEMONADE OUT OFLEMONS

1517

Gould nails that point, and he's certainly right about it. There is a vital role
for Gould's "sober," well-informed "resourceful policy advocates."
But, just as clearly, "sober" reason without more cannot rally policy
makers to enact reform. For better or worse, the story of a wrongful
conviction is often a story about the face of evil: indifference to the truth;
indolence in the face of evidence that demanded investigation; raw abuse of
authority. Some human beings entrusted with power are destined to abuse
it. No procedural reform holds out any real hope of restoring trust and
confidence in the criminal justice system, or effectuating real change, unless
corruption and evil are rooted out and punished. We risk seeming to
appease forces of prejudice, indifference, and oppression if we avoid stating
that undeniable fact.
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